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accuses contracts. It 
true customers to 
s as two 
111 
First, under the Telephone Solicitation Act, DTC Group's contracts are "null and 
void" because of DTC Group's failure to register as a telephone solicitor with the Idaho Attorney 
General's office. Void contracts as opposed to contracts that are merely voidable -- cannot 
serve as the basis of a tortious interference claim as a matter of law. 
Second, as DTC Group has conceded on appeal, no customer breached a contract with 
DTC Group because the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act gives customers an unqualified right 
to cancel their purchase within three days, "without any penalty or obligation whatsoever." I.C. 
§ 48-1004. DTC Group's argument that it need not establish the breach of an underlying 
contract has been expressly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court For either of these reasons, the 
District Court erred in denying the ]NOV motion on DTC Group's claim for tortious interference 
with contract. 
The District Court similarly erred in denying DOT Compliance's JNOV motion on the 
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In denying that motion, 
the District Court concluded that the jury's verdict was supported by evidence that David Minert 
and/or Jeff Minert reported DTC Group to the FBI with regard to a price-fixing proposal. On 
appeal, DTC Group concedes that the District Court's conclusion was wrong because the call to 




at of s 
argument contradicts \vell-established public policy encouraging citizens to participate in lmv 
enforcement investigations. It also ignores the fact that the July 10th meeting occurred prior to 
execution of the Settlement Agreement. In any event, neither the call to the FBI nor any 
participation in the FBI investigation violates any express or imp! icd obligation in the Settlement 
Agreement. Thus, it cannot serve as the basis of claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
Finally, the District Court's award of attorney shou Id reversed because DTC 
Group did not prevail on any claim that arises out of a commercial transaction between the 
parties. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Failed to Apply the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act 
1. The District Court Erred in Denying JNOV on the Claim for Tortious 
Interference with Contract Because DTC Group's Contracts \Vere Void Ab 
Initio, as a Matter of Law, for Failure to Register as a Telephone Solicitor 
DTC Group claims that DOT Compliance tortiously interfered with its contracts by 
informing DTC Group customers of their statutory cancellation rights and encouraging them to 
cancel. R., 000236-237. That claim fails as a matter of law because DTC Group's contracts are 




ten ( 10) 
with it 
it to 17 
Under the clear language of the Idaho Telephone Solicitation DTC Group's failure 
to renders its contracts "null and void. LC. § 1007. 
. . 
DTC Group does not dispute on appeal the fact that it failed to registered as a telephone 
sol with the Idaho Attorney General's Office. Respondent's Brief, p. 6. Instead, it 
echoes the District Court's erroneous conclusion that DOT Compliance lacks "standing" to 
challenge DTC Group's contracts as void. In support of that argument, DTC Group relies upon 
Barlow v. Int'/ Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881 (1974). However, Barlow does not hold that a 
defendant lacks standing to raise the fact that a contract at issue in an intentional interference 
claim is void. To the contrary, Barlow holds that a void contract cannot be the subject of an 
intentional interference claim as a matter of law. 
Barlow did not involve a void contract. Instead, the defendant in Barlow sought 
dismissal of an intentional interference with contract claim on grounds that the payment term in 
the underlying contract was so "uncertain" that the contract was rendered "unenforceable." Id. at 
893. OTC Group selectively quotes this Court's holding as follows: 
Whether or not such alleged uncertainty of a term would have 
rendered the contract unenforceable in an action brought by one of 
the parties to the contract is irrelevant to the question of whether 
the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of the tort of 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 3 
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states the at 
the contracts may be the subject 
of an intentional claim, the Court clarified footnote omitted by DTC Group that 
"[t]he rule is otherwise with regard to contracts void ab initio. Id. at 893, footnote 2. This 
Court just recently re-affirmed the rule of law that "a claim for tortious interference with a 
contract is available when a contract is voidable or unenforceable but is not available when the 
contract is void ab initio." Silicon lnt'l Ore, JLC v. Monsanto Co., 1 Idaho 538,551 (2013); 
see also Int'/, Inc. v. Battelle Energy Alliance, /LC, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093 (D. Idaho 
2010) (entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant because the non-compete 
agreement with which it allegedly interfered violated the law and was, therefor, "void" and not 
merely "voidable"). 
The District Court failed to apply this important distinction and did not analyze whether 
DTC Group's contracts were "void" or merely "voidable." Instead, it held -- contrary to this 
Court's repeated pronouncements that a "void" contract cannot serve as the basis of an 
intentional interference claim as a matter of law -- that DOT Compliance lacked standing to raise 
the fact that DTC Group's contracts are void. See Tr., 654:12-15. 
Given the undisputed fact that DTC Group is not a registered telephone solicitor as 
required by the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, its purported contracts with customers are 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 4 
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DOT Compliance also was not with the ldaho Attorney 's Office for a period 
of time. However, once informed of the registration requirement, DOT Compliance registered as 
. . 
a telephone solicitor \vith the Idaho Attorney General's office as required by law. Tr., 574: 12-
17. OTC Group did not. 603: 17 - 605 When DTC Group finally got around to registering 
just prior to trial, the Idaho Attorney General's Office rejected its registration application 
because it did not have a clearly stated cancellation policy as required by the Idaho Telephone 
Solicitation Act. Tr., 603: 17 - 605:22. ln any event, the only issue before this Court is whether 
OTC Group's contracts are "void" or merely "voidable" as a result of its failure to register. 
Given that the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act declares those contracts "null and void," the 
District Court erred in denying DOT Compliance's JNOV motion. 
2. The District Court Erred in Denying DOT Compliance's Motion for Directed 
Verdict on the Claim for Tortious Interference with Contract Because DTC 
Group's Customers had a Statutory Right to Cancel within Three Days 
"[A] prima facie case of the tort of interference with contract requires the plaintiff to 
prove: (a) the existence of a contract; (b) knowledge of the contract on the part of the defendant; 
(c) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract; [and] (d) injury to the plaintiff 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 5 
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(emphasis added). As a matter of law, however, the customers did not breach their contracts 
when they terminated those contracts because the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act gives 
customers an unqualified right to cancel their purchase within days, "without any penalty 
or obligation whatsoever." LC. § 1004. 
DTC Group has conceded that, as a result of the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, no 
breach of contract occurs when a customer cancels its contract: 
Q ..... And so if a customer -- if any of these customers called you 
within three days after they purchased and wanted to cancel, that 
customer has not violated their -- or breached their contract with 
you, right? 
A. Correct. 
Tr., 338:22 - 339:23; see also Respondent's Brief, p. 31 (acknowledging that, "[i]f a contract is 
terminable at the will of a party to the contract and that party terminates the contract, that party 
has not breached the contract but has only exercised their right to terminate."). 
DTC Group did not present evidence to establish an essential element of its intentional 
inference claim -- ''intentional interference causing a breach of the contract." Bliss Valley 
Foods, 121 Idaho at 283-84. Accordingly, the District Court erred in denying DOT 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 6 
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s 
in s it asserts 
customers of 'l 
statements to customers. is not 
to on to a 
contract with In DTC Group did not bring a defamation claim against DOT 
Compliance. It asserted a claim for breach of the non-disparagement in the Settlement 
Agreement, but the jury concluded that DTC Group failed to establish any damages related to 
that claim. R., 000329-330. 
Instruction 
Over DOT Compliance's objection, the District Court issued a jury instruction that 
misstated the elements of an intentional interference claim. Specifically, the District Court 
removed from the standard lDJI 4.70 jury instruction the requirement that DOT Compliance 
"intentionally interfered with the contract, causing a breach," and replaced it with an instruction 
requiring only that intentional interference caused "termination" of the contract. R., 000318. 
OTC Group argues that the modification to the jury instruction finds support in Wesco 
Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881(2010). However, that case did not eliminate the 
requirement that the defendant's intentional interference caused a breach of a contract. After 
noting that "[l]iability may arise for tortious interference with a contract even where the contract 
is terminable at will," the Court reiterated that the plaintiff still must establish "intentional 
interference causing a breach of the contract" as an essential element of a tortious interference 




s as y 
found that because the employees didn't breach their employment was no 
claims. Respondent's Brief, p. 31. That is exactly right; there can be no claim for 
. . 
intentional interference without evidence showing that the "intentional interference caus[ ed] a 
breach of the contract." Id. at 895 
Oddly, OTC Group cites Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266 
(1991) in further support of its position. That case explains exactly why the District Court's jury 
instruction was erroneous. In Bliss Valley Foods, Robert Erkins ("Erkins") asserted that First 
National Bank tortiously interfered with his contractual relationships by (l) interfering with his 
consulting contract with Bliss Valley Foods and (2) interfering with his receipt of lease payments 
from real property he had leased to Bliss Valley Foods. Id. at 283. Much like the District Court 
here, the trial court in Bliss Valley Foods issued a jury instruction that omitted the third element 
of a tortious interference claim as set forth in Barlow -- "intentional interference causing a 
breach of the contract." Id. ( emphasis in original). 
Instead of mirroring the elements of a tortious interference claim as set forth in Barlow, 
the trial court in Bliss Valley Foods issued a jury instruction replacing the third element of the 
tort -- "intentional interference causing a breach of the contract" with an instruction requiring 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 8 
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Id. in original). 
Court then \Vent on to explain that liability for tortious with contract 
. . 
turns on whether the consulting contract was terminable without causing a breach. Specifically, 
Court explained that, if the consulting contract was "terminable without other having a 
claim against it for breach of contract, then Erkins' claim based on the loss of those consulting 
would not be the tort of interference with contract as set out in Barlow .... " Id. at 286. 
''Only if Erkins had a contract with Bliss Valley which would subject Bliss Valley to damages 
for breach of contract if it terminated the consulting contract with Erkins would Erkins have a 
claim for tortious interference with a contract under Barlow." Id. 
This Court held that the jury instruction issued in Bliss Valley Foods was erroneous and 
constituted reversible error because it "omitted the requirement from Barlmv, in the tortious 
interference with the contract claims, that the bank's conduct was an 'intentional interference 
causing a breach of the contract"' Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court set aside 
the jury's verdict. 
The same analysis applies here. Just as in Bliss Valley Foods, the District Court's jury 
instruction constitutes reversible error because it "omitted the requirement from Barlow, in the 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 9 
47999 0001 79430291 
s 
covenantofgoodfirith by 
Group to its customers in violation of the non-disparagement provision of the Settlement 
Agreemen~. R., 000235. Consistent with the pleadings, the Distric_t Court's jury instruction 
provided that jury could only issue a verdict against a defendant who "unfairly disparaged 
plaintiff to others so as to nullify or impair the benefits of the plaintiff under the contract," 
causing damage to DTC Group. R., 000316 (Jury Instruction No. J 7). The jury returned a 
verdict of $20,000 against both David Minert and Jeff Minert, individually, for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R, 000333-334. However, the jury did not issue 
a verdict against DOT Compliance because of a lack of damages. Id. 
"[T]he sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict must be based upon the jury 
instructions.'' Masell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269,275 (2013). "Whether 
the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict will therefore depend upon the law as set forth 
in the jury instructions." Id. The jury's verdict must be set aside because there is simply no 
evidence in the record that David or Jeff Minert "unfairly disparaged plaintiff to others so as to 
nullify or impair the benefits of the plaintiff under the contract" as required by Jury Instruction 
No. 17. 





817 - 818:17. 
call to the FBI occurred prior to execution of the Settlement and the District 
Court expressly excluded any damages (i.e., time, resources and attorney that DTC Group 
allegedly incurred addressing the FBI investigation and subsequent grand jury proceedings. Tr., 
467:22-25 (conceding that "[T]he report to the FBI took place well, before July 10th 
meeting ... .''); Id. at 191 :4 192: 14; 206: 19 214: 17 ( excluding evidence of the "time and money 
having to spend away from the company dealing with a grand jury investigation that in our mind 
was frivolously alleged" because DTC Group had not disclosed such a claim for damages in its 
Complaint or in discovery). 
DTC group acknowledges on appeal that the call to the FBI cannot support the verdict 
and now expressly disavows that theory. Respondent's Brief, p. 20 ("As a point of clarification, 
DTC Group did not claim that [David or Jeff Minert] defamed DTC Group, or breached the 
Settlement Agreement with DTC Group, when they reported DTC Group to the Department of 
Justice on claims of criminal price fixing."). DTC Group similarly concedes that the District 
Court was wrong in its statement that Jeff Minert disparaged DTC Group to a customer in a 
recorded call. Id. at p. 27 ("DTC Group never asserted that Dave or Jeff Minert themselves 
actually made customer calls."). 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 11 




comments or Jeff none 
a verdict against David or Jeff Minert for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
l. Allegations of 
Claim for 
Bad Faith Do Not, as a Matter of Law, State a 
of the Implied Covenant of Good and .Fair Dealing 
First, DTC Group argues that, although neither David nor Jeff Minert made disparaging 
comments or otherwise breached the Settlement Agreement, they "entered the Settlement 
Agreement in bad faith with no intention of ever complying with its terms after its execution." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 20. That argument fails for several reasons. As an initial matter, there is 
no evidence that David or Jeff Minert failed to comply with the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement. DTC Group presented no such evidence at trial and they point to no such evidence 
now. 
Moreover, an assertion that a party entered into an agreement in bad faith does not, as a 
matter of law, state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The implied covenant of good faith "only requires that the parties perform in good faith the 
obligations imposed by their agreement." Silicon Int'! Ore, 155 Idaho at 552. "Thus, before a 
party can breach this covenant there must be a contract." Id. As one court recently explained: 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 12 
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formation and arose independent of the initial 
misrepresentations, we conclude that the plaintiffs have alleged 
insufficient facts upon which to base a claim for breach of the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cc1s. Corp., 261 Conn. 620, 638-39 (2002); see also 27 
lliston on Contracts§ 70:48 (4th ed.) ("The general duty faith and dealing 
extends only to the performance and enforcement of a contract and does not apply to the 
negotiation stage prior to the formation of the contract. Therefore, a failure to act in good faith 
and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing during precontractual negotiations 
does not amount to a breach."). 
2. DTC Group's Call to the FBI and Subsequent Meeting with Crossett 
Occurred Prior to Execution of the Settlement Agreement, and the District 
Court Excluded Damages Related to the FBI Investigation 
Next, even though it has now disavowed a claim arising out of the FBI report, DTC 
Group claims now for the first time on appeal that David and Jeff Minert breached the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing when they "wrongfully attempted to 'implicate' Mr. 
Crossett for criminal price fixing." Respondent's Brief, p. 22. It appears that OTC group is 
trying to draw a distinction between the original "report" to the FBI -- which occurred a few 
weeks prior to execution of the settlement agreement -- and the subsequent July 10th meeting 




covenant fair dealing. (explaining that the video 
to 
to 
original "report" or the later meeting "implicating" Crossett -- were excluded by the District 
Court. Id. at 191 - 192: 14; 206: 19 - 21 17 ( excluding evidence of the "time and money 
. . 
having to spend away from the company dealing with a grand jury investigation" because DTC 
Group had not disclosed such a claim for in its Complaint or in discovery). Thus, the 
jury's verdict cannot be supported either by the FBI report or any alleged attempt to "implicate" 
Crossett in the price-fixing scheme. Even now, OTC Group docs not identify any damages 
associated with its claim that the Minerts "implicated" it in a price-fixing scheme. 
Finally, even if the July 10th meeting had not occurred prior to execution of the 
settlement agreement, and even if the District Court had not excluded damages related to the FBI 
investigation, it still could not serve as the basis of a claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. The Settlement Agreement does not address, much less prohibit, the 
Minerts from participating in an FBI investigation. Any such inference would fly in the of 
sound "public policy intended to encourage private citizens and victims not only to report crime, 
but also to assist law enforcement with investigating and apprehending individuals who engage 
in criminal activity." Kelley v. Tcmoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 601 (Ind. 2007). Allowing the verdict 
to stand based on the call to the FBI or any participation in the investigation would have a 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 14 
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and 
Group asserts that jury's verdict is supported by an inference that "Dave and 
Jeff Minert continued to instruct DOT staff to DTC group and/or take DTC 
Group's customers." Respondent's Brief, p. 24. As an initial matter, the jury's verdict for 
of the implied covenant of faith and fair dealing cannot be based on allegations of 
DOT Compliance "tak[ing] DTC Group's customers" because that was the basis of DTC 
Group's claim for tortious interference with contract for which it was awarded $20,000 in 
damages. R., 000236-237 (Amended Complaint, ~l(j[ 41-46). Otherwise, DTC Group would 
receive a double recovery. See e.g, R., 317 (Jury Instruction No. 18, instructing that jury that 
damages awarded for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "must be 
distinct from any damages awarded for breach of contract.''). 
Moreover, taking customers from DTC Group cannot constitute a violation of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the Settlement Agreement does not prohibit DOT 
Compliance from competing for customers. See Van v. PortneufMed. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 562 
(2009) (the implied covenant "only arises in connection with the terms agreed to by the parties, 
and does not create new duties that are not inherent in the [contract]"). 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 15 
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, an inch vidual until 
to 
not 
to make disparaging about Id. at 387:7-16. is simply no evidence in 
the record that David of Jeff Minert instructed employees to disparage OTC Group or otherwise 
breached the Settlement Agreement. 
Other DOT Compliance Employees 
On a related theory, DTC Group argues that David and Jeff Minert, as principals of DTC 
Group, are individually liable for any disparaging comments made by DTC Group employees in 
violation of the Settlement Agreement. See Respondent's Brief, p. 29 ( citing Jury Instruction 
No. 23 for the proposition that, "As principles of and for DOT Compliance, Dave and Jeff 
Minert are liable for their own actions and the actions of their agents."). 
As an initial matter, DTC Group has misstated the law of agency. As set forth in Jury 
Instruction No. 23, an employer company (the principal) is liable for the actions of its employees 
(agents). R., 000322. However, that rule of agency does not make the individual owners of a 
limited liability company individually liable for the actions of the entity's employees. David and 
Jeff Minert are members of DOT Compliance, which is an Idaho Limited Liability Company. 
R., 000229 (Amended Complaint, <ii 2). Absent a piercing of the corporate veil (which was never 
alleged, much less factually supported), limited liability company members are not individually 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 16 





employees, David and Jeff cannot as a matter of law. 
Perhaps more importantly, the jury expressly rejected DTC s claim liability 
based on allegations of disparagement on the part of other DOT Compliance employees. DTC 
group asserted a clairn for 
DOT Compliance separate 
of the irnplied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against 
its claims against David and Jeff That claim was based 
on the allegations that DOT Compliance employees disparaged DTC Group in violation of the 
Settlement Agreement. R., 000235 (Amended Complaint,~[ 30-34). The jury expressly found 
that DTC Group suffered no damages as a result of DOT Compliance's alleged breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R., 000333-334. Thus, the verdict against 
David and Jeff Minert cannot be supported by allegations that other DOT Compliance 
employee's violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by disparaging DTC Group in 
breach of the Settlement Agreement. 
5. The District Court Declined to Issue a Spoliation Instruction 
Finally, DTC Group argues that David and Jeff Minert should be held liable for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failing to produce recordings of customer 
calls. This issue is a red herring. DTC Group asked the District Court to issue a spoliation 




at 70 I: 15 -
cannot nmv 
is not to 
and Jeff Minert. the question on is whether any supports a 
finding that David Jeff Minert "unfairly disparaged plaintiff to others so as to nullify or 
impair the benefits of the plaintiff under the contract." The call recordings referenced by DTC 
Group are not of David or Jeff Minert. See Id. at p. 27 ("DTC Group never asserted that Dave or 
Jeff themselves actually made customer calls. 
In summary, there is no evidence in the David or Jeff "unfairly 
disparaged plaintiff to others so as to nullify or impair the benefits of the plaintiff under the 
contract," as required by the applicable jury instruction. Accordingly, the District Court erred in 
denying DOT Compliance's JNOV motion with regard to the jury's verdict against David and 
Jeff Minert for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
C. In the Alternative, the District Court Erred in Excluding the FBI Recording 
The District Court abused its discretion when it precluded DOT Compliance from playing 
for the jury a video of the July 10, 2014 meeting during which Crossett outlined his price-fixing 
scheme on grounds that it was "impeachment on a collateral issue." Id. at 471:23-25. DTC 
The Spoliation motion does not appear to be in the Record on Appeal. 




as an 1 at to 
statement to 
proposed the price-fixing scheme and then a frivolous report to the FBI that Crossett 
. . 
proposed an illegal price-fixing scheme. Id. at 186:24 - 189:9; Id. at 359: I 0-21. In its closing 
argument, DTC Group specifically asked the to consider the time DTC Group had to spend 
"to respond to the FBI investigation" when considering its damages award, even though the 
Court had excluded all alleged damages related to the FBI investigation they were not 
disclosed prior to trial. Id. at 739:19 - 740:5. 
The parties gave two completely different accounts of the July I 0th meeting and the 
events leading up to it.2 Crossett testified that the Minerts proposed a price-fixing scheme, 
frivolously and falsely reported to the FBI that Crossett proposed the price-fixing scheme and 
2 DTC Group takes issue with DOT Compliance's characterization of Crossett's trial 
testimony as "insist[ing] that he did not propose any price fixing." Respondent's Brief, p. 34. 
DTC Group asserts that "upon review of Mr. Crossett's testimony he made no such 
allegation." Id. Yet, that is exactly what Crossett stated in his trial testimony in response to 
questioning from its counsel: 
Q: Were you price fixing? 
A: Absolutely not. 
Tr., 359:20-21. 




consider those damages when calculating its damages award: 
Let's talk ahout damages for a minute .... 
. . . . And, remember, although -- remember I told you· about there 
was these non-monetary or damages that David couldn't really 
quantify. things like ... administrative time, time to respond 
to the FBI investigation, things of that nature that we're not going 
to be able to recoup because we lost that third bucket. But just 
keep in mind that those damages were there for David. 
Id. at 739: 19 - 740:5. 
rt 
The jury did exactly what DTC Group asked it to do and awarded damages based on the 
FBI investigation. Indeed, the District Court denied DOT Compliance's JNOV motion on the 
specific grounds that the jury's verdict against David and Jeff Minerts for violation of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was based on the call to the FBI. Id. at 817 :9 - 818: 17 
("And I think in this case the jury could infer that the Minerts and thereafter their company were 
responsible for the calls to the Department of Finance, the calls to the FBI ... and that was the 
basis for their finding of liability."). 
OTC Group is taking two completely inconsistent positions on this issue. On one hand, 
DTC Group argues that the July 10th meeting is "collateral" and "irrelevant" to any issue in this 
case. See Respondent's Brief, p. 34. On the other hand, although dropping its reliance on the 
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District Court erred by it. If the July l 0th meeting is an "immaterial lateral 
-- i.e., because it was wholly unrelated to the Settlement Agreement and before 
execution of the Settlement Agreement, or because DTC Group did not disclose it as a basis for a 
damages claim then it cannot support the jury' verdict. Either ,vay, the jury's verdict must be 
set aside. 
Jury's Must Be Set for 
In addition to the reasons set forth above, and as explained in DOT Compliance's 
opening brief, the $20,000 verdicts against David and Jeff Minert for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be set aside for lack of damages. "fW]here a 
plaintiff presents no evidence to support a jury's damage award, the court must grant a JNOV 
motion in favor of the defendant." Bratton v. Scott, 150 Idaho 530, 537 (2011 ). 
The District Court concluded that the jury's verdict was supported by the fact that David 
and/or Jeff Minert reported OTC Group to the FBI. Id. at 817:9 - 818: 17. However, OTC Group 
did not establish any damages caused by the FBI Investigation, much less damages in the amount 
of $20,000. OTC Group attempted to testify as to the "damages" it suffered as a result of the 
FBI investigation, including the time, resources and attorney fees it spent in connection with the 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 21 
47999.000! .7943029. l 
a or at 191 · I 




If this Court sets jury's verdicts for any of the reasons discussed it must 
also vacate the District Court's attorney fee award because DTC Group will no longer be the 
prevailing party. La Bella Vita, LLC v. Simler, 158 Idaho 799,817 (201 ("Given the reversal 
of the district court's decision, Shuler and Eikova are no longer the prevailing parties in this case. 
Thus, the award of attorney is vacated."). 
Even if this Court does not set aside the jury's verdicts, the attorney fee avvard must still 
be reversed. Although DTC Group prevailed on two of its several claims, neither of those claims 
permit an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ). 
1. DTC Group Did Not Prevail on its Breach of Contract Claim 
The Settlement Agreement provides for an award of attorney fees to the "prevailing 
party" in an "action brought to enforce any provision of this Agreement, including but not 
limited to actions for breach of Sections 4 and 5 of this Agreement." Trial Exh. 500. DTC 
Group asserted a breach of contract claim against DOT Compliance, David Minert and Jeff 
Minert. Specifically, DTC Group alleged that those defendants breached Section 4 of the 
Settlement Agreement (the non-disparagement provision) by disparaging DTC Group to its 







contract are: (a) the of the contract, (b) the breach ( c) the breach caused 
and (d) amount of damages."). 
. . 
DTC Group cites no authority for its argument that it is the prevailing party on the breach 
of contract claim even though it proved no damages. In fact, that argument been rejected by 
the United States Supreme Court. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) ("When a 
plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of 
his claim for monetary relief [citation omitted], the only reasonable is usually no fee at all."); 
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987) ("Respect for ordinary language requires that a 
plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail."). 
2. The Tortious Interference with Contract Claim did Not Arise out of a 
Commercial Transaction 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees to the party that prevails 
on claims arising out of a commercial transaction between the parties. "Idaho Code section 12-
120(3) applies when 'the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit."' Sims 
v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,342 P.3d 907, 911-12 (2015). "When a lawsuit has multiple claims, 
courts look at each individual claim to determine what statutory basis allows attorney fees 
recovery on that claim." Id. "In other words, courts analyze the gravamen claim by claim." Id. 
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In support of its argument for attorney Group cites Blimka v. Web 
vl'lwl esa I er, 143 Idaho 723 (2007), for the proposition that a claim sounding in tort can 
. . 
result in an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) if the claim arises out of a 
commercial transaction. OTC Group then argues that its tortious interference claim arose out of 
a commercial transaction because "OTC Group sued Appellants for 'transacting' \vith its 
customers and interfering with contracts with its customers; DOT entered transactions with DTC 
Group contracted customers for a commercial purpose." Respondent's Brief, p. 38. 
While it is true that tort claims arising out of a commercial transaction may trigger 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ), that is only the case if the tort claims arise out of a 
contract between the parties, not a contract with some third party. Printcrqft Press, Inc. v. 
Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 461 (2012) ('Thus, even though fees are available 
in cases involving a tort claim, a commercial transaction between the parties to the lawsuit 
must form the basis of the claim.") (emphasis in original). 
Here, the tortious interference claim in OTC Group's Amended Complaint makes no 
reference to the Settlement Agreement or any other commercial transaction between the parties. 
R., 000236-37. Instead, it alleges that DOT Compliance interfered with commercial transactions 






transactions vvere involved. This Court that award of attorney 
tortious claim did not from a commercial transaction hetween the parties." 
Id. 
A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would usually 
out of a commercial transaction, Le., the contract hetween the parties. Here, however, the 
verdict for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not based on any 
obligation imposed by the Settlement Agreement or any other commercial transaction between 
the parties. Instead, as the District Court acknowledged, the verdict was based on the call to the 
FBI -- an act that is not governed by the Settlement Agreement and, in fact, occurred prior to 
execution of the Settlement Agreement. Tr., 817 :9 - 818: 17. Indeed, DTC Group has conceded 
that the call to the FBI did not violate the Settlement Agreement. See Respondent's Brief, p. 20 
("As a point of clarification, OTC Group did not claim that [David or Jeff Minert] defamed OTC 
Group, or breached the Settlement Agreement with OTC Group, when they reported DTC Group 
to the Department of Justice on claims of criminal price fixing."). 
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As set forth above, neither claim on which DTC Group prevailed arose out of a 
commercial transaction between the parties. Accordingly, the award of attorney fees must be 
vacated. 
m 
Even if the Court determines that one or both of the claims on which OTC Group 
prevailed arose out of a commercial transaction, this case should still be remanded to the District 
Court to determine an appropriate award of attorney fees based on an apportionment analysis. 
"When a lawsuit has multiple claims," a trial court is required to "look at each individual claim 
to determine what statutory basis allows attorney fees recovery on that claim" and then 
"bifurcate the claims and award fees pursuant to § 12-120(3) only on the commercial 
transaction." Sims, 157 Idaho 980, 342 P.3d at 911-12. 
The District Court did not go through that analysis. Instead, it stated in an oral ruling 
from the bench, without any analysis of the individual claims, that "I don't believe this is an 
appropriate case for apportioning the fees," and awarded DTC Group the entirety of its attorney 
fees even though DTC Group did not prevail on the vast majority of its claims. Tr., 824: 10-12. 
The attorney fee award must be set aside and remanded for a recalculation of attorney fees based 
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aside the jury's verdict, the Court should award on appeal to 
Appellants pursuant to Idaho ~ I I 20(3) and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
HI. C()NCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth the jury's verdicts for tortious with contract 
and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be set aside and the 
District Court's award of attorney fees vacated. Upon setting aside the jury's verdicts, the Court 
should mvard Appellants their attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code ~ 1 120(3) and 
Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 and remand to the District Court to determine an appropriate 
award of costs and attorney fees to Appellants as prevailing parties. 
DA TED THIS 2nd day of March, 2016. 
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